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Abstract
The observation of declining discount rates in experimental settings has led many
to promote hyperbolic discounting over standard exponential discounting as the pre-
ferred descriptive model of intertemporal choice. I develop a new framework, consis-
tent with the random utility model, which directly models the intertemporal utility
function and produces explicit maximum likelihood estimates of discounting para-
meters. I apply this estimation method to a stated-preference survey of river basin
cleanup options and revealed-preference lottery payment choices. Formal statistical
tests fail to nd evidence in support of hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Annual discount rates range from ten to fourteen percent across the data sets and
empirical specications.
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Every day we make decisions involving tradeo¤s of benets and costs over time.
Would I rather spread my workload evenly over the next few days and distribute
the pain or procrastinate and have an extremely painful task several days from now?
Should I exercise regularly while Im younger so that I can enjoy the health benets
when Im older? Will I invest time and money in my education today so that
I can have a better lifestyle later? Am I willing to give up some consumption
today so that I and others can enjoy a better environment in the future? These
intertemporal choices penetrate nearly every aspect of our behavior. Such decisions
require weighing benets and costs that are realized with di¤ering temporal patterns.
Typically, individuals discount future outcomes, but how much, and in what way?
To answer this question, I develop a new approach that facilitates estimating
discount factors for monetary choices or for other choices that can be presented in
a stated-preference framework. I directly model the intertemporal utility function
associated with an intertemporal outcome, which produces explicit estimates of dis-
counting parameters within a random utility framework. This empirical strategy
allows direct testing of competing hypotheses of how people discount future benets
and costs in a unied statistical framework.
Some previous evidence suggests that individuals discount the future hyperboli-
cally or quasi-hyperbolically. That is, some studies nd that inferred discount rates
decline over time. These results mostly stem from experimental settings with private
goods. It is also important to understand how individuals discount future public good
improvements, which has not received as much research attention. Public support for
policies with immediate costs and delayed rewards can di¤er greatly under hyperbolic
and exponential discounting. Furthermore, natural real-world intertemporal choices
have not been extensively studied. Thus, I present an estimation strategy that is
exible enough to handle public goods, experimental data, and real-world monetary
choices.
After presenting the statistical model for estimating discount factors, I estimate
the model on three data sets. One source is a stated-preference survey on river basin
improvements, one is comprised of choices that individuals make when they win state
lottery jackpots, and the nal source is stated-preference monetary choices from a
previously published paper. The former data set represents a public good choice, and
the other two represent private good choices. These three sources provide a diverse
representation of discounting at the individual level. All data sets produce similar
discounting results. For the sample sizes in the empirical evidence used in this paper,
there seems to be no statistical evidence supporting hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic
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models over the standard exponential model. Constant annual discount rates range
from ten to fourteen percent over the three data sets and various specications.
I explore a variety of specications to model heterogeneity in preferences for the
river basin improvements. I examine the case where only discount factors are al-
lowed to randomly vary across individuals, the case where only parameters on basin
improvement and net income are allowed to vary across individuals, and the case
where all model parameters are allowed to vary across individuals. I nd substantial
evidence of heterogeneity in time preferences for both exponential and hyperbolic
discounting. However, I nd no evidence that this heterogeneity is explained by
observable personal characteristics. Likewise, I nd signicant heterogeneity in the
marginal utility of basin improvement and net income when utilizing random coe¢ -
cients but virtually no evidence that observable personal characteristics can explain
the heterogeneity. In the preferred specication, where all parameters are treated as
random, I estimate a mean exponential discount rate of 12.8 percent. Due to the
nature of the variation in the revealed preference lottery data, I am not able to get as
good of a test on hyperbolic discounting as one would like. Nevertheless, I estimate
a mean exponential discount rate of 12.99 percent. Hence, mean discount rates from
Americans in di¤erent parts of the country and in di¤erent contexts are remarkably
similar and in line with interest rates that we see in capital markets, such as those
on personal credit cards.
1 Existing Literature
1.1 Historical Development of the Discounted Utility Model
Samuelson (1937) rst developed the discounted utility (DU) model in an attempt
to provide a general model of intertemporal choice. Commonly referred to as the
exponential discounting model, the DU model simplied all discounting into a single
parameter, the discount rate. A consumers preferences over consumption bundles,
(co; c1; :::; cT ) are represented by an intertemporal utility function, U(co; c1; :::; cT ):
Furthermore, the DU model assumes that the intertemporal utility function is de-
scribed by
U(c0; c1; :::; cT ) =
TX
t=0
 tu(ct); (1)
where the discount factor for year t is  t =
h
1
1+
it
and  is the discount rate.
Samuelsons DU model was accepted almost immediately because of its analytic
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simplicity and elegance. Interestingly, Samuelson did not endorse the DU model
as a normative model of intertemporal choice or as a valid descriptive model. The
DU model was never empirically veried but still became the standard model for
intertemporal utility (Frederick et al., 2002).
1.2 Departures from the Discounted Utility Model
In the past several decades, research has uncovered many situations in which the DU
model does not t behavior.1 One major departure from the DUmodel is that inferred
discount rates often decline over time in experimental settings. This phenomenon is
commonly termed hyperbolic discounting. This discounting gets its name because a
hyperbolic functional form ts the data better than the traditional exponential func-
tional form. Several functional forms have been suggested for hyperbolic discounting.
The most popular of these takes the form of
 t = (1 + t)
 =;where ;  > 0 (2)
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). As  goes to 0, this hyperbolic discounting function
becomes the exponential discounting function. To facilitate estimation, researchers
typically simplify equation 2 to have only one parameter. Constraining  to be equal
to one produces the model suggested by Harvey (1986). Harveys single-parameter
hyperbolic structure is given by
 Harveyt = (1 + t)
 : (3)
Alternatively, constraining the ratio of = to be equal to one results in the single-
parameter model suggested by Herrnstein (1981) and Mazur (1987) (HM);
 HMt = (1 + !t)
 1: (4)
In recent years, an alternative model of discounting that has received much at-
tention is the quasi-hyperbolic (; ) discounting model. This model, developed by
Laibson (1997), is also motivated by the observation of declining discount rates. The
functional form was rst introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the context of
intergenerational altruism. The form of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting function
is very simple and its contrast with the standard exponential discounting model is
1See, for example, Cairns and van der Pol (2000, 1997)
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Figure 1: Comparison of Discount Factors: Exponential (t) with  = :9, Harvey
Hyperbolic ((1 + t) ) with  = :4, Quasi-hyperbolic (1; t) with  = :75,  = :92,
and HM Hyperbolic ((1 + !t) 1) with ! = :15.
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readily apparent. The functional form is given by
 t =
(
1 if t = 0 and
t if t > 0
)
; where 0 <  < 1; and  < 1: (5)
Thus, the only di¤erence between discount factors in the quasi-hyperbolic formulation
and the exponential formulation is that all future time periods are discounted by the
additional  factor in the quasi-hyperbolic model. Especially large importance is
placed on immediate utility as compared to deferred utility. The (; ) discounting
model is much easier to analyze than the true hyperbolic model, yet it retains many
of the qualitative aspects of the more complicated model.
As shown in Figure 12, both hyperbolic and the quasi-hyperbolic discounting
functions weight the near future less heavily than exponential discounting. However,
for time periods far in the future, exponential discounters place less weight on the
deferred utility than hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounters. Figure 2 shows the
corresponding marginal discount rates for all four discounting functions. The point
plotted for time period t is the marginal discount rate between time period t  1 and
2The parameter values used for the exponential, Harvey hyperbolic, and HM hyperbolic models
in these gures are consistent with those that I nd from the data sets employed in this paper. The
 chosen for the quasi-hyperbolic model is in the range of values discussed in the literature.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Marginal Discount Rates: Exponential (t) with  = :9,
Harvey Hyperbolic ((1 + t) ) with  = :4, Quasi-hyperbolic (1; t) with  = :75,
 = :92, and HM Hyperbolic ((1 + !t) 1) with ! = :15.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Time Period
M
ar
gi
na
l R
at
e
Marginal Discount Rates
Quasi-hyperbolic
Exponential
Harvey
HM
time period t:
Exponential discounters will always display time consistency because their mar-
ginal discount rate is constant over all time periods. Quasi-hyperbolic discounters
have a large marginal discount rate between time period 0 (now) and time period 1 and
a constant marginal discount rate thereafter. Thus, quasi-hyperbolic discounters are
dynamically consistent for any choice that does not involve the present. Regardless,
most interesting economic choices involve the present. Finally, hyperbolic discounters
always have declining discount rates. Therefore, a hyperbolic discounter is subject to
dynamic inconsistency for any time period. However, hyperbolic marginal discount
rates change less for time periods farther in the future. That is, they will be less
likely to be dynamically inconsistent for tradeo¤s that occur far in the future than for
tradeo¤s that occur near to the present. Hyperbolic discounting makes individuals
appear to be impatient for immediate tradeo¤s, but su¢ ciently patient for tradeo¤s
occurring far enough in the future.
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Table 1: Present Discounted Values of 100 Dollars Now vs. 120 Dollars 1 Year from
Now for Exponential with  = :9, Harvey Hyperbolic with  = :4, HM Hyperbolic
with ! = :15, and Quasi-hyperbolic with  = :75;  = :92
Model Discounted Value
of $100 Now
Discounted Value
of $120 1 Year
from Now
Choice
Exponential $100.00 $108.00 $120 in 1 Year
Harvey Hyperbolic $100.00 $90.95 $100 Now
HM Hyperbolic $100.00 $92.30 $100 Now
Quasi-hyperbolic $100.00 $82.80 $100 Now
A simple example highlights the time inconsistency inherent in hyperbolic and
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Assuming parameter values that are in the range of
those found in the literature, I analyze the choice between $100 now and $120 a year
from now and compare this with the choice between $100 ve years from now and $120
six years from now. The interval length between the options for each choice is one
year so a dynamically consistent discounter should choose either the more proximate
reward in both scenarios or the more distant reward in both scenarios. Table 1
presents the discounted values of $100 now and $120 one year from now for all four
discounting models. Table 2 shows the discounted values of $100 ve years from now
and $120 six years from now. The exponential discounter remains consistent in their
choice to take the deferred payo¤. However, the hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic
discounters choose the early reward for the immediate tradeo¤ and choose the more
distant payo¤ for the future tradeo¤.
It is desirable to be dynamically consistent from a normative standpoint. With
free access to capital markets, individuals should equate the marginal rate of substi-
tution between two time periods to one plus the interest rate. A third party planner
could improve a hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounters intertemporal utility by
rearranging consumption between time periods. In contrast, the welfare of an expo-
nential discounter that is trading o¤ consumption between time periods at one plus
the interest rate cannot be improved upon by a third party planner.3
3Note that in this paper I abstract from the notion of discounting the utility of others. While
that is a fundamental question in itself, I only examine the behavior of an individual concerned with
their own utility.
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Table 2: Present Discounted Values of 100 Dollars 5 Years from Now vs. 120 Dollars
6 Years from Now for Exponential with  = :9, Harvey Hyperbolic with  = :4, HM
Hyperbolic with ! = :15, and Quasi-hyperbolic with  = :75;  = :92
Model Discounted Value
of $100 5 Years
from Now
Discounted Value
of $120 6 Years
from Now
Choice
Exponential $59.05 $63.77 $120 6 Years from
Now
Harvey Hyperbolic $48.84 $55.10 $120 6 Years from
Now
HM Hyperbolic $57.14 $63.16 $120 6 Years from
Now
Quasi-hyperbolic $49.43 $54.58 $120 6 Years from
Now
1.3 Discounting Studies
I concentrate on several of the more recent contributions and note that a more ex-
tensive literature review on discounting is provided by Frederick et al. (2002). While
three recent working papers use utility-theoretic models incorporating goods other
than money, the majority of previous studies examine monetary trade-o¤s over time.
I point out that much of the evidence supporting hyperbolic discounting can be recast
in terms of confounding factors.
1.3.1 Estimation Methods
The most common method for gathering data on discounting is to elicit experimental
responses to hypothetical or real monetary rewards. Two approaches are most widely
utilized. Respondents are either asked to choose between two di¤erent sized rewards
realized at di¤erent times in the future or to state the payo¤ today that would make
them indi¤erent to a larger payo¤ in the future (or the payo¤ in the future that would
make them indi¤erent to a smaller payo¤ today). Harrison et al. (2002) represents
the former approach and Coller and Williams (1999) falls into the latter category.
Harrison et al. nd an overall individual discount rate in Denmark of 28.1 percent
using money data and they observe signicant heterogeneity in the data. One notable
exception to the experimental emphasis is the revealed-preference study by Warner
and Pleeter (2001). They examine the decisions of military personnel when faced
with a downsizing. Personnel choices of whether to take a lump sum payment or an
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annuity reveal information about their intertemporal preferences.
Several recent experimental papers have relaxed the assumption of linear utility. If
individuals truly possess concave utility functions, the erroneous assumption of linear
utility would lead to an overestimation of discount rates. Andersen et al. (2008) elicit
risk preferences and discount rates of Danish individuals using experiments. They
nd an average discount rate of approximately 10 percent when allowing for a concave
utility function as compared to approximately 25 percent when assuming linear utility.
They are unable to test for quasi-hyperbolic discounting since they employ a front-
end delay experimental design. Andreoni and Sprenger (2010a,b) design a set of
experiments to generate simultaneous estimates of discounting and utility curvature
parameters. They nd average annual discount rates that range between 20 and 35
percent across specications and studies, which are considerably lower than the rates
from many previous experimental studies. Andreoni and Sprenger (2010a) do nd
evidence of concave utility but do not nd evidence of hyperbolic discounting.
Various studies have examined discounting for health outcomes. This branch of
the discounting literature appears to begin with Horowitz and Carson (1990). In
these studies, respondents state how many lives saved in the future is equivalent
to saving a certain number of lives today, or respondents choose between varying
durations of illness experienced at di¤erent times in the future. van der Pol and
Cairns (2001) use this second method and provide the rst example of discrete choice
experiments to address discounting for health outcomes.4
Two recent related papers use an empirical model that is similar to the model
I propose. Bosworth et al. (2006) jointly estimate individual-specic discount rates
and the demand for preventative public health policies. They utilize a conjoint survey
design in which respondents make choices between policies that reduce the number
of illnesses and deaths in their community. At the same time, they have individuals
choose between a hypothetical lottery that provides a series of payments over several
years and a lottery that provides a lump sum payment. This method is based on
the identication strategy developed by Cameron and Gerdes (2003). The authors of
both papers argue that the two distinct data sources allow improved joint estimation
of the utility parameters and discount rates and that it is often not possible to identify
discounting parameters out of a public goods choice.
I show that discounting parameters for public goods are identied in a stated-
preference framework if the policy options are designed correctly. Bosworth et al.s
4Multiple other health discounting studies exist. For example, see two papers by Johannesson
and Johansson (1997a,b).
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(2006) empirical model uses a utility-theoretic structure for preferences and assumes
i.i.d. extreme value errors for the policy choices. Bosworth et al. (2006) do not allow
for discount rates to take forms other than the standard exponential and single para-
meter hyperbolic models. I extend the model to test for quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
Viscusi et al. (2008) design a study to infer discount rates for a publicly provided
good. They utilize a stated preference survey concerning improvements in local water
quality to identify individual rates of time preference. Using a random utility model,
they nd that the data t better with the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model than
with the exponential discounting model. They employ a two-stage empirical approach
to generate parameter estimates but do not conduct hypothesis tests on the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting parameters. I build upon the survey design from Viscusi et al.
The random utility theoretic framework herein produces explicit standard errors for
all discounting parameters so I am able to formally test quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
1.3.2 Confounding Factors in Discounting Studies
Although evidence in the literature suggests that individuals have hyperbolic dis-
counting preferences, I propose that some of this evidence can be explained by con-
founding factors. As emphasized in the review article by Frederick et al. (2002), it
is important to di¤erentiate between pure rates of time preference and other reasons
that cause individuals to care less about future outcomes. Pure time preference
refers to "the preference for immediate utility over delayed utility" (Frederick et al.,
2002). Confounding factors that cause individuals to care less about the future but
should be considered separately from pure time preference include uncertainty about
a future outcome, perceived future transaction costs, and the phenomenon of sub-
additive discounting. In this section, I show how experimental designs that do not
address these three confounding factors could make an exponential discounter appear
as though they are a hyperbolic discounter.
Imagine an experimental setting in which an individual is choosing between a
smaller immediate reward and a larger delayed reward. Uncertainty in the receipt of
the future reward can be problematic for estimating discount rates in this scenario.
Suppose that this individual is truly an exponential discounter but perceives only a 70
percent chance that the researcher will actually deliver the delayed reward at any time
in the future and a 100 percent chance that the immediate reward will be delivered.
Then, the results from the experiment would look exactly like the individual is a
quasi-hyperbolic discounter with a  value of 0.7. Or, suppose that this individual is
truly an exponential discounter with a constant discount factor of  < 1 but believes
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with probability p0 = 1 that they will receive an immediate reward, with probability
p1 < 1 that they will receive a delayed reward at t = 1, and with probability pt, such
that pt+1 < pt and pt+1   pt > pt+2   pt+1, that they will receive a delayed reward
at time t. That is, the perceived probability of receiving a future reward declines at
a decreasing rate. Then, observed discount factors including the confounding e¤ect
of uncertainty are given by f1; p1; p22; p33; p44; :::g: Marginal observed discount
rates are given by f1=p1   1; p1=p2   1; p2=p3   1; p3=p4   1; :::g: These resulting
observed discount rates are consistent with a hyperbolic functional form. To further
illustrate with a numerical example, assume  = :9; p1 = :8; p2 = :7; p3 = :65; p4 = :61:
This gives marginal discount rates of f38:9%; 26:9%; 19:7%; 18:4%g: However, when
abstracting from the e¤ects of uncertainty, true marginal rates of time preference are
given by f1=  1; 1=  1; 1=  1; :::g. Thus, it is important to minimize the e¤ects
of future uncertainty in a discounting study.
Next, suppose that within an experimental setting an individual perceives a trans-
action cost of ct in order to collect a payment at time t in the future. Also suppose
that this individual is an exponential discounter with a discount factor of t. Then, in
order to be indi¤erent between an immediate payment of $x0 and a delayed payment
of $xt; it must be that x0 = 
t(xt + ct): If ct+1 = ct for all t > 0, observed marginal
discount rates look like quasi-hyperbolic discount rates. If ct+1 > ct for all t > 0
observed marginal discount rates can look like hyperbolic discount rates.
To make ideas more concrete, consider the following example. Consider this in-
dividual indicating their indi¤erence point between an immediate reward of $100 and a
larger delayed reward. Let the perceived future transaction costs c = fc0; c1; c2; c3; c4g =
f0; 10; 20; 30; 40g: Assume  = :9: Denote the marginal discount rate between time
periods t and t + 1 as rt;t+1: Let superscripts of true and obs denote the true (ex-
ponential) and observed values. Then rtruet;t+1 = 11:1% for all t: Denote the delayed
reward at time period t as xt: Next, ignoring the transaction cost, c0, it holds that
100 = :9  x1: Solving, x1 = 111:11 would make this individual indi¤erent in ab-
sence of transaction costs. Taking into account the e¤ect of the transaction cost,
100 = obs1 (111:11 + 10): Solving, 
obs
1 = :8257: Then, r
obs
0;1 = 1=
obs   1 = 21%:
Again ignoring the transaction cost, c1, 100 = :81  x2. Solving, x2 = 123:46 would
make this individual indi¤erent in absence of transaction costs. Taking into account
the e¤ect of the transaction cost, 100 = obs
2
2 (123:46 + 20): Solving, 
obs2
2 = :6971.
This implies robs1;2 = 
obs2
2 =
obs
1   1 = 18:45%: Continuing with this pattern, I nd
robs2;3 = 16:53% and r
obs
3;4 = 15:10%. I observe declining marginal discount rates even
though the true marginal discount rates are constant. The larger the transaction
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cost relative to the size of the reward, the more pronounced this e¤ect will be.
One other explanation for the observation of declining discount rates is the idea of
subadditive discounting. That is, "discounting over a delay is greater when the delay
is divided into subintervals than when it is left undivided" (Read, 2001). Many
laboratory experiments look over days or months and confound the length of the
delay with the length of the interval between choices. For example, a researcher will
compare the discount rate inferred from a choice involving zero to six month delays
to that from a choice involving zero to twelve month delays. When annualized, the
discount rate will look larger from the choice involving zero to six month delays.
Therefore, the discount rate looks like it declines over time. However, discount
rates are declining because the length of the interval is increasing. Many researchers
anchor all choices to a particular time and do not design choices to keep interval length
independent from the length of delay. Typically, a shorter interval length necessarily
means a shorter delay until the delayed outcome. Read (2001) uses experiments
to verify the presence of subadditive discounting but nds no evidence of hyperbolic
discounting.
1.3.3 Indirect Tests of Hyperbolic Discounting
Several studies have attempted to determine whether exponential or hyperbolic dis-
counting is preferred. In this section, I summarize the studies that have indirectly
tested for hyperbolic discounting. Also, I analyze how each study addresses un-
certainty in a delayed reward, perceived future transaction costs, and subadditive
discounting.
Kirby and Marakovic (1995) t hyperbolic and exponential discount functions for
each subject. They utilize nonlinear regression techniques on the continuous time
equations for exponential and hyperbolic discounting. They nd that, while both do
a good job explaining subjectsresponses, the hyperbolic model ts better in terms of
R2 for almost all of the subjects. Uncertainty in the payment of the delayed reward
is present since delayed rewards were not to be delivered until the evening on the
day that it came due. Transaction costs are especially relevant because the rewards
are small ($14.75-$28.50 for delayed rewards). This study confounds length of delay
until the delayed reward is received with the length of the interval between options
since all choices are anchored to the present.
Slonim et al. (2007) conduct an experimental study in which they examine whether
or not possession of the delayed reward a¤ects subjectsdiscounting patterns. They
nd that discount rates decline over time in all cases. Possession of rewards sup-
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ports quasi-hyperbolic discounting and no possession supports hyperbolic discounting.
They do not nd any evidence of exponential discounting. This study attempts to
control for transaction costs in the best way possible by using possession of the reward
as a control variable. Also, this study uses a common interval length of two months
for all choices so interval length is not confounded with the length of delay until the
receipt of the future reward. Uncertainty in future rewards is nullied in the cases
where individuals choose between two future rewards if the perceived probability of
receipt of the reward is constant over time. However, uncertainty in future rewards
is still an issue if the probability of receipt of the reward declines with longer time
delays. Also, for the choices anchored to the present, uncertainty in future rewards
remains a confounding factor.
Cairns and van der Pol (2000) compare three hyperbolic models with the exponen-
tial model. For each individual and discounting model, they rst estimate optimal
parameter values using non-linear least squares. Second, they regress these parame-
ter values on the period in years for which the benet is delayed, claiming that delay
should be insignicant for a correctly specied discounting model. Delay is insigni-
cant only in the Loewenstein and Prelec model (2 parameter hyperbolic). They also
note that the rst stage regressions have the highest R2 for the hyperbolic models.
Since all choices are anchored to one year in the future, uncertainty in rewards is
controlled for if the perceived probability of receiving the reward is constant over all
time periods but not if the perceived probability of receipt declines with time. Trans-
action costs are minimized in the case of social nancial benets since the receipt of
the reward does not require any work on part of the survey respondent. For private
nancial benets, transaction costs likely get larger as the delayed reward moves far-
ther into the future. If transaction costs are constant over all future time periods,
they will have no inuence in this study since all choices are anchored to one year
from the present. However, because of this common anchor, the length of delay and
length of interval are confounded. Subadditive discounting may explain any evidence
for hyperbolic discounting.
Keller and Strazzera (2002) examine the predictive accuracy of the exponential and
hyperbolic models in a simulated data set. Using Thalers (1981) 1981 experimental
data to calculate implicit monthly discount rates, the authors generate a simulated
data set of predicted matching values, mt, that would make a respondent indi¤erent
to an immediate reward, m0. Comparing these predicted values with the actual
matching values from Thalers data set, they nd that the hyperbolic model does a
better job than the exponential model. Thus, indirect tests suggest that hyperbolic
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discounting is preferred to exponential discounting. All choices are anchored to the
present. This leaves open the possibility of confounding e¤ects from uncertainty in
future rewards, future transaction costs, and subadditive discounting.
As previously mentioned, Andreoni and Sprenger (2010a) do not nd any evidence
of hyperbolic discounting. They are careful to equate transaction costs between more
proximate and delayed payments so that any transaction cost e¤ect would be negated.
They also take considerable action to reduce uncertainty in the receipt of a delayed
reward. Interestingly, when Andreoni and Sprenger (2010b) reintroduce uncertainty
in the reward payo¤, they observe that experiment participants exhibit less utility
concavity for certain consumption compared to uncertain consumption and dispropor-
tionately prefer certain consumption. The result is that present consumption would
be disproportionately preferred to delayed consumption and individuals could appear
to be quasi-hyperbolic discounters due to the di¤erences in their evaluation of certain
and uncertain consumption.
I build on these previous discounting studies by closely considering potential con-
founding factors. I select data sets that minimize uncertainty in (hypothetical and
real) delayed rewards, decision-maker transaction costs, and subadditive discount-
ing. Through jointly addressing these experimental concerns and developing a new
empirical model that directly estimates the discounting parameters, I attempt to iso-
late pure rates of time preference for various models and test to nd the statistically
preferred model.
2 Empirical Strategy
2.1 Derivation of the General Model
Here I present the random utility model to analyze discrete choice data. This model
analyzes choices over goods that are intertemporal in nature. In general, let the
instantaneous utility for an individual i for choice j in year t be given by
uijt = vijt + ijt: (6)
Here, vijt contains a vector of observed variables relating to choice j and a vector of
xed coe¢ cients and ijt is the instantaneous error draw. It is important to note at
this point that instantaneous utility is not at all observable. That is, the researcher
only observes behavior at the choice level.
I make the usual assumption that intertemporal utility is additively separable over
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time periods. Denote the nal time period for which any of the alternatives in the
choice set, s, have an impact on decision-maker utility as Ts: Then the utility for
individual i that is associated with choice j dened through time period Ts is given
by
Uij(uijt;  t) =  0uij0 +  1uij1 + :::+  TsuijTs ; (7)
where  t is the discount factor for year t.
5 Substituting equation 6 into equation 7
and rewriting in summation notation produces
Uij =
TsX
t=0
 tvijt + ij; (8)
where ij =
PTs
t=0  tijt is the error for individual i associated with choice j. Thus, the
intertemporal utility from a choice is essentially the weighted sum of all instantaneous
utilities. Discount factors determine the weight placed on each time period. The
specication of vijt will depend on the type of intertemporal choice that is being
analyzed.
2.2 Structure of the Error Terms
Since a rational individual makes utility evaluations at the instantaneous level and
discounts them back to the present, it is appropriate to assume the distribution of
the instantaneous errors (ijt). However, the researcher observes choices at the alter-
native level so it is necessary to use the model structure to determine the alternative
level error structure. This approach contrasts the Bosworth et al. assumption that al-
ternative errors are i.i.d. extreme value. I show in the appendix that even i.i.d. error
assumptions at the instantaneous level imply heteroskedastic errors at the alternative
level.6
It is appropriate to build in correlation across utilities for a given individual in
panel applications where decision makers face more than one choice occasion. One
approach would be to assume that the ijt are correlated across time periods, alterna-
tives, and choice occasions. I do not take this approach as the model quickly becomes
intractable. Another approach when analyzing panel data is to specify random para-
5I rst derive the basic model without allowing for individuals to have di¤ering discount fac-
tors. Later, I show how the likelihood function generalizes to accomodate a random coe¢ cients
specication on the discount factors.
6In the applications contained herein, results do not substantially change if I ignore the het-
eroskedasticity. As further explained in the subsequent subsection, this could be a result of the
properties of the survey design utilized.
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meters. One option to model correlation across choices for a given decision maker is
to assume that the discounting parameters are randomly distributed.7 Alternatively,
one could assume vijt contains a vector of random coe¢ cients to model an individuals
correlated utilities.8 To ease exposition, I initially develop the model and likelihood
function here assuming that vijt does not contain any random coe¢ cients.
2.3 The Log-likelihood Equation
For each choice set, s, an individual chooses the alternative that provides the most
utility. Therefore, the probability that individual i chooses alternative j from s is
Pij = Pr(Uij > Uik 8k 6= j 2 s): (9)
The task is to determine the form of Pij: Begin by substituting equation 8 into
equation 9 to get
Pij = Pr(
TsX
t=0
 tvijt + ij >
TsX
t=0
 tvikt + ik) (10)
= Pr(ik   ij <
TsX
t=0
 tvijt  
TsX
t=0
 tvikt) (11)
Next, denote the alternative error-di¤erence term as
~
ikj = ik   ij: Recall that
ij =
PTs
t=0  tijt and note (shown in Appendix) that the variance of the alternative
error-di¤erence term,
~
ikj, is
V (
~
ikj) = 2 
TsX
t=0
 2t : (12)
Therefore, for any choice set, the variance of the alternative error-di¤erence term will
be larger when one or more alternatives have longer durations. Ignoring this in the
likelihood function can lead to inconsistent parameter estimates and biased standard
error estimates. Returning to equation 10 and using the denition of the c.d.f. (F)
7Again, in this initial model derivation, I assume discounting parameters are non-stochastic since
two of the three applications herein do not involve panel data. I later show how the likelihood
function generalizes to allow for random discounting parameters.
8I derive the simulated log likelihood equation for the case of random coe¢ cients within vijt in
the appendix.
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of a normal random variable, I have
Pij = F
0@PTst=0  tvijt  PTst=0  tviktq
2 PTst=0  2t
1A : (13)
The log-likelihood equation is then
LL =
X
i
X
j
yij lnPij; (14)
where yij = 1 if i chose alternative j and zero otherwise.
Note that observations from choice sets with alternatives having longer durations
are weighted less heavily than observations from choice sets with alternatives having
shorter durations, which corrects for heteroskedasticity in the data. Depending on
the correlation between the duration of choice alternatives and the other observed
variables, this heteroskedasticity correction may or may not prevent signicant bias
in parameter estimates. If, for example, the number of time-periods across which
future conditions will di¤er between alternatives is determined independently from
other attributes of the alternatives, then the heteroskedasticity is not likely to create
much bias. Utility di¤erences from choices with longer time horizons will be divided
by a larger denominator than choices from shorter time horizons, but this doesnt
a¤ect parameter estimates substantially because the survey was designed to have
low correlation between survey attributes. If, however, data come from contexts
where we would expect correlation between choice alternative characteristics, then it
could be important to correct for this heteroskedasticity. For example, there may be
correlation between policy characteristics in revealed preference data from real world
referenda. Voters often choose between low levels of public goods provided at low
cost and high levels of public goods provided at high cost. Suppose further that a
low level of the public good would have a shorter time horizon and a high level of the
public good would have a longer time horizon. Then, cost and quantity of the public
good are correlated with policy duration and a researcher may nd that ignoring the
heteroskedasticity leads to biased estimates.9 This heteroskedasticity argument also
relates to prior literature on discrete choice experiments. For example, DeShazo and
Fermo (2002) show that it is important to control for heteroskedasticity that arises
from characteristics of the choice sets.
9This is analogous to having a non-representative sample. If such selected sampling is uncorre-
lated with the dependent variable in a regression, the slope estimates will not di¤er substantially
from those for a representative sample.
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2.4 Application to a Public Good Choice
This model is particularly well suited to analyze discrete choice experiment data. Dis-
crete choice experiments allow the researcher to specify several attribute dimensions
of the intertemporal choices. Thus, the researcher can specify when the benets and
costs of an intertemporal choice are to be realized so that it is possible to identify the
discount factors from respondentschoices. Public goods policies are a good example
of choices that receive benets and costs at di¤ering points in time. For example, it
is common to pay taxes today for a public good that will deliver benets years into
the future. In this section I develop the model for discrete choice experiments in the
context of public goods choices.10
At any time the utility an individual receives from a simple public good policy de-
pends on the level of benet provided and the cost incurred. Specify the deterministic
portion of instantaneous utility as
vijt = qijt + (Iit   cijt); (15)
where q ijt is the level of benets from the public good, I it is income, and cijt is the
cost of the public good for individual i for policy j in year t.11 In this specication,
 is the marginal utility of the public good benet and  is the marginal utility of
money. Let Tj denote the last year for which there are non-zero costs or benets for
policy j. Substituting equation 15 into equation 8 results in
Uij =
TjX
t=0
 t[qijt + (Iit   cijt)] + ij: (16)
This equation is the foundation of my econometric model.
Because only di¤erences in utility matter in the random utility model (RUM), any
personal characteristic on its own such as Iit drops out of the analysis. Personal char-
acteristics can enter through interactions with policy characteristics. Since  0 = 1 by
economic theory, there are Tj + 2 parameters to estimate in this model. The  para-
meter is identied through contemporaneous variation in the level of the public good
benet. Similarly, the  parameter is identied through contemporaneous variation
in the level of cost of the policy. That is,  and  can be identied without consid-
10Viscusi et al. (2008) provide the rst example of a study designed to infer discount rates for
public goods.
11I am imposing risk neutrality here on preferences because instantaneous utility is linear and
additively separable in income.
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ering the discounting. Then, the discounting parameters ( t) are identied through
variation over time. If there is not enough variation in the data to identify each  t
individually, structure can be placed on the type of discounting.12 For example, with
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, there are only two discounting parameters (; ). Ex-
ponential discounting imposes the restriction that  = 1 in equation 5. A likelihood
ratio test on the constrained and unconstrained models determines whether I reject
the null hypothesis that  = 1. This is an improvement over previous studies which
tend to assume a specic functional form for discounting.
Until now I have ignored any potential correlation across utilities for a given indi-
vidual. However, each individual usually evaluates multiple choice scenarios in stated
preference surveys. A more realistic model should therefore build in correlations
among the utilities for di¤erent alternatives faced by an individual. Both random
coe¢ cients and error components specications can accomplish this and are formally
equivalent (Train, 2003). As previously stated, there are several ways to incorporate
random parameters. I investigate three di¤erent random parameter approaches for
the Minnesota River Basin application; one treats only discounting parameters as
random, another species random coe¢ cients on the public good benet and public
good cost, and one assumes all model parameters ( ; ; and ) are random. The
simulated log likelihood functions for these random parameters specications are in
the appendix.
2.5 Application to a Monetary Choice
Suppose that an intertemporal monetary choice, j, describes a real or hypothetical
amount of money, mijt, that will be paid to or collected from individual i, in time
period t. During any time period, an individual receives utility from their non-
experimental income, Iit, and the money from the experiment, mijt: Specify the
deterministic portion of instantaneous utility as
vijt = (Iit +mijt); (17)
12It is di¢ cult to imagine a revealed preference data source that would provide su¢ cient in-
tertemporal variation to identify each discount factor separately. One could imagine a clever stated
preference survey in which respondents make a huge number of choices with di¤erent time hori-
zons that would facilitate such an estimation of each time periods discount factor. I do not take
this approach in my survey so in this paper I restrict attention to exponential, hyperbolic, and
quasi-hyperbolic functional forms.
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where  is the marginal utility of money. Substituting equation 17 into equation 8
results in
Uij =
TjX
t=0
 t[(Iit +mijt)] + ij: (18)
The choice probabilities and likelihood equation are then derived with straightforward
substitutions into equations 13 and 14.
3 Data
3.1 The Minnesota River Basin Survey
I administered a survey to 250 Minnesota residents in January of 2008 to gain in-
formation about individualspreferences for immediate and delayed environmental
improvements. The specic environmental improvement utilized for the survey is a
proposal to improve water quality in the Minnesota River Basin (MRB). The Min-
nesota River Basin13 encompasses an area surrounding the Minnesota River of ap-
proximately 16,770 square miles, or roughly ten million acres. The Minnesota River
ows from Big Stone Lake on the Minnesota / South Dakota border until it joins the
Mississippi River at Fort Snelling near St. Paul, Minnesota (see Figure 3). As Min-
nesotas largest tributary to the Mississippi River, the Minnesota River doubles the
volume of the Mississippi at their conuence. Largely rural, 92 percent of the land
around the Minnesota River Basin is used for agricultural purposes. With such a high
percentage of agricultural use, nonpoint source water pollution is a major problem
for the Minnesota River Basin. According to the Minnesota River Data Center at
Minnesota State University, Mankato (2007), the Minnesota River is one of the most
seriously polluted rivers in the state of the Minnesota and the United States.The rst
portion of the survey familiarizes respondents with the study area and provides basic
information about the sub-basins within the MRB. This portion of the survey also
gathers some information about the respondentsprior knowledge and use of the study
area. Next, the survey explains the current environmental situation of the MRB and
informs respondents that the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency is currently de-
veloping pollution limits for impaired areas in the MRB. Additionally, respondents
receive information about the specic actions that the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency is considering for improving water quality in the MRB.
13The following description borrows heavily from the description developed by Nicholas Flores
(2008).
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Figure 3: The Minnesota River Basin
The subsequent portion of the survey presents discrete choice experiment questions
to respondents. Discrete choice experiments have several desirable characteristics for
valuation purposes. One can dene multiple attributes of an environmental policy
and estimate the partworths of each attribute instead of valuing the policy as a whole.
By including cost as an attribute, one can calculate the value of other attributes.
In the context of this paper, I can calculate the willingness to pay for river basin
improvements by including an attribute for the percentage of the MRB that is cleaned
and an attribute for cost of the policy per year. Finally, attribute-based questions
simulate choice scenarios that individuals make on a daily basis. Respondents are
presented with a choice set and must select their most preferred option.
In order to introduce the time dimension of this study, the survey explains that
while water quality improvements may sometimes happen now there may be situations
where improvements will not occur until some time in the future. I ask respondents
to consider policies that would temporarily increase water quality in the Minnesota
River Basin. This survey design follows the strategy utilized by Viscusi et al. (2008).
There are two alternatives available to the respondent for each choice scenario and
each policy is dened by three attributes:
 Percentage of Basin Cleaned. This is the percentage of the Minnesota River
Basins surface waters having water quality high enough after the cleanup is ful-
lled to: 1) maintain healthy, diverse and successfully reproducing populations
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of aquatic organisms, including invertebrates such as craysh and snails and
vertebrates such as sh, AND, 2) be suitable for swimming and other forms of
water recreation. Once the cleanup is fullled, the improvement lasts for a total
of ve years. After ve years of improved water quality, funding for the policy
ends and water quality returns to its previous level.
 Cost of the Policy Per Year. This is the amount of money that a household
would have to contribute per year in the form of increased state income taxes.
For each policy, your household would make ve yearly payments of increased
taxes, beginning immediately this year.
 Time When Cleanup is Fullled. This is the year in which the cleanup
is fullled to the level of the policy. The water quality improvement ends ve
years after the cleanup is fullled.
"Percentage of Basin Cleaned" has three levels and ranges from fty to seventy
percent. "Cost of the Policy Per Year" has three levels and ranges from $100 to $300
per year. "Time When Cleanup is Fullled" has six levels: zero, one, two, three,
four, and ve years from now.
The survey goes on to reinforce a few key components of the policies. Respon-
dents are instructed that cleanups that happen in the future are just as certain as
cleanups that happen today. While I dont explicitly survey respondentsperceptions
about their condence of future rewards, I argue that my assertion about the relative
certainty of future cleanups is plausible because once a public policy is passed, a law
that stipulates a future cleanup is just as binding as a law that calls for an immediate
cleanup. I establish a common reference point for respondents by stating that zero
percent of the basin cleaned means that none of the surface waters of the MRB are
cleaned up. To remove any potential heterogeneity in prior beliefs, I state that zero
percent cleaned is the current situation. Similarly, one hundred percent of the basin
cleaned means that all of the surface waters of the MRB are cleaned to levels high
enough to support sh and recreation. I also reiterate the timing of the costs and
benets of the proposed policies. Pretests indicated that respondents understood all
of these clarifying points.
Survey participants from Survey Sampling International (SSI) completed the ques-
tionnaire on the internet. SSI maintains a large pool of internet respondents in
Minnesota, the United States, and across 72 countries. Individuals voluntarily join
SSIs panel with participation incentives. The survey was hosted on a University of
Colorado server, and SSI notied their panel of Minnesota residents by email of the
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online survey instrument. Interested participants were then redirected from SSIs
website with a unique identication number to the survey instrument. Because of the
unique identication number, I could avoid duplicate responses and allow respondents
to save and continue at a later time. After removing partial responses from some in-
dividuals that did not complete all required questions, I was left with a sample of 237
individuals. Each respondent faced a series of eight attribute-based stated preference
questions. All together, this yielded a total of 1819 choice occasions.
Table 3 presents demographic information for the study sample as well as the
Minnesota population as a whole. The information on the Minnesota population
comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2007 American Community Survey (2007).
Some of the sample characteristics match up well with Minnesota demographics. For
example, educational and race measures are similar between the survey sample and
the Minnesota population. On the other hand, the study sample is clearly older
and weighted more heavily toward females than the Minnesota population.14 The
median income of the survey sample is lower than that of the Minnesota population,
but I have an imprecise measure of income from the survey.15 While this is not a
representative sample, there is enough variation to test for di¤erences based upon
personal characteristics. Also, this sample is much more diverse than the average
sample of undergraduate students utilized for experimental work.
3.1.1 Survey Design
To identify the discounting parameters in this model it is essential that there is enough
intertemporal variation. The survey design must provide enough variation while still
remaining plausible and comprehensible to the survey respondents. That is, one must
consider the real world decision so that policy options make sense. In this section I
explore how the survey design can a¤ect the ability to identify discount factors.
For illustrative purposes, rst consider the two extremes of intertemporal varia-
tion. On one extreme, if benets and costs vary across policies, individuals, and
all time periods, model parameters are overidentied. At the other extreme, if all
policies have the same time horizon and costs and benets do not vary across time
periods within policies, discounting parameters are not identied. This follows from
the general property of the RUM that parameters that only a¤ect scale of utility are
14As shown later in Table 10, neither age nor income is signicantly related to model parameters.
15Participants reported income on the survey by selecting one of the 10 bracketed ranges. The
lower bound on the highest bracket was $150,000. As a result, all participants that fell in the highest
category were coded with an income of $150,000. In actuality, many of these individuals likely
earned more than this amount.
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Table 3: Demographics for the Minnesota River Basin Survey and the State of Min-
nesota
Characteristic MRB Survey
Sample
Minnesota
Population
Median Age 51.0 36.9
(Standard Deviation) 15.16
Percent Male 21.1 49.8
Median Household Income $ 42,500 $ 55,616
(Standard Deviation) $ 34,324
Percent High School Degree or Higher 98.3 90.7
Percent Bachelors Degree or Higher 34.2 30.6
Percent White 92.4 88.0
Percent Black or African American 1.3 4.3
Percent American Indian or Alaska Native 2.1 1.0
Percent Asian 2.1 3.4
not identied. As the discounting parameters get larger the scale of utility increases
but choice behavior is not at all impacted because all policies get more attractive at
the same rate.
When considering the design of the survey it is important to make the policy
choices as close to a real life situation as possible. In the case of public goods, I
believe that it is most realistic to have costs uniformly start today and benets start
with a delay of zero to Q years, with Q selected such that respondents still believe
that the policy will a¤ect them. It is common for taxes to begin now and continue
with a specic duration at the same cost per year and benets to arrive at di¤erent
times in the future at the same level of benets per year.
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Huber and Zwerina (1996) identify four principles in designing survey questions
for choice experiments to make the choice design more e¢ cient. Level balance means
that each level of an attribute should occur an equal number of times in the survey.
Orthogonality means that attributes should not be correlated in the design stage.
Minimal overlap stipulates that attribute levels should be repeated within choice sets
as little as possible. Utility balance attempts to balance the utility of the alternatives
within a choice set. It is not generally possible to simultaneously uphold all four
of these design principles. One popular quantitative measure of design e¢ ciency
is D-error = jj1=k, where  is the covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood
estimator in the conditional logit model and k is the number of parameters in the
model. By minimizing D-error, the researcher can approximately satisfy the four
design principles.
Clearly, utility balance can only be achieved when the researcher has some a pri-
ori information about the parameters to be estimated. Huber and Zwerina (1996)
show that even when the parameter estimates are incorrect there are e¢ ciency gains
from using them in the survey design. The SAS choice¤ macro directly minimizes
D-error to generate e¢ cient choice designs for the conditional logit model, allowing
the researcher to use a priori estimates on model parameters. To my knowledge, no
research exists on design e¢ ciency for more complicated models like the one proposed
here. However, meeting the design principles for the simple conditional logit model
should provide a good design for the more complicated model. Applying this rea-
soning, I use the conditional logit results from Viscusi et al. (2008) as the parameter
estimate inputs for the choice¤ macro to create my survey design.
There is little consensus on how many choice sets to create or how many choice
sets each individual should face. Respondents can become fatigued when faced with
too many choice sets. Additional choice complexity has been shown to increase
inconsistencies in respondentschoices as in DeShazo and Fermo (2002). Including
too few choice sets can lead to an inability to estimate the desired parameters. In
my design, I generate 32 choice sets and divide them into four versions so that each
respondent answers eight choice questions. I identify discount factors by varying
the level of the River Basin cleanup and the number of years until the cleanup is
fullled. The cost attribute facilitates estimation of the per-year willingness to pay
but does not a¤ect the discount rate because costs have the same time dimension over
all alternatives. Simulation analysis conrms that this survey design is su¢ cient to
identify the discounting parameters. 16
16Simulation results are not presented in this paper but are available from the author.
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As previously stated, each choice set contains two alternatives, each with three
attributes: "percentage of basin cleaned," "cost of the policy per year," and "time
when cleanup is fullled." The rst two attributes each have three levels, while the
third attribute has six levels. Table 4 shows a sample discrete choice question from
one of the survey versions. 17
Importantly, note that this survey design keeps the length of delay before the
more delayed cleanup independent from the length of the interval between cleanup
alternatives. Also, since this is a public good choice, transaction costs are not a factor.
Once a respondent indicates their preferred policy, they no longer have a role in the
execution of the policy. The e¤ort required of the respondent is no di¤erent whether
the cleanup happens today or years from now. Finally, uncertainty in the receipt
of a future reward is also minimized as much as possible in this survey. Explicit
instructions are repeated in the survey that there is no di¤erence in the probability
of cleanup for a policy with immediate benets versus one with delayed benets, and
it is hoped that respondents believe these assertions.
I do not have an experimental design in this survey that allows the testing of the
assumption of linear utility while simultaneously estimating discounting parameters
because I am using the tradeo¤ between the percentage of the basin cleaned and the
timing of the improvement to identify discount rates. However, I can specify a model
where I represent the levels of basin improvement and cost with indicator variables
and use researcher imposed discounting parameters to test for linear changes from
level to level. For basin improvement, and assuming an exponential discount rate
of eleven percent, the ratio of the di¤erence between the utilities of the rst two
17See the online Appendix for the attribute levels in all versions. The survey in its entirety is
available from the author.
Table 4: (Sample Question) If you had to choose, would you prefer Policy A or Policy
B?
Characteristic Policy A Policy B
Percentage of Basin Cleaned 50% 70%
Cost of Policy Per Year $100 $300
Time When Cleanup is Ful-
lled
2 Years From Now (2010) Now (2008)
Check the box of the policy you
prefer
I prefer Policy A I prefer Policy B
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levels to the di¤erence between the utilities of the second two levels is 1.06. The
analogous ratio for cost is 0.85. A ratio of 1 would indicate utility that is linear
in that particular attribute so I conrm that utility is approximately linear in the
amount of basin improvement and cost.
In any case, the results of Andersen et al. (2008) and Andreoni and Sprenger
(2010a) suggest that the discount rates (factors) estimated from a linear utility speci-
cation would be upper (lower) bounds on the discounting parameters from a concave
utility function. Also, if uncertainty did in fact still remain regarding the delivery
of future improvements, this would serve to make survey participants appear more
present-biased and hyperbolic in their discounting. That is, uncertainty would tend
to make participants look less like exponential discounters. Thus, the nding of expo-
nential discount rates would be strengthened by the argument that there is residual
decision-maker uncertainty.
3.2 Italian Money Data
I also have money choice data from Alberini and Chiabais (2007) survey of 776 Italian
residents.18 In this survey, respondents choose between a hypothetical immediate
lump sum payment and a hypothetical stream of constant payments over 10 years.
The lump sum payment option is always e10,000 received now. The stream of
constant payments option is varied with annual payments of e1150, e1500, or e1650.
The respondents also have a third option of being indi¤erent between the lump sum
and the annuity. In this analysis, to match the analysis performed in Alberini and
Chiabai, I omit the observations for which the respondent is older than 59. This leaves
505 observations.
3.3 State Lottery Lump Sum vs. Annuity Choice Data
In addition to the two stated-preference data sources already presented, I introduce
a data set containing choices that lottery jackpot winners have made between lump
sum and annuity payment options. Many states o¤er winners the option between a
smaller lump sum payout and a larger sum of annual payments the annuity option.
Winners make choices over huge sums of money, providing a rich source of revealed-
preference data. I have gathered data from three di¤erent state lotteries: Colorado
Lotto, Texas Lotto, and Florida Lotto. These three states have open records laws
18I am grateful to the authors for generously sharing these data.
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which facilitated collection of the data.19
Annuity options are dened by two variables; the number of annual payments
and the dollar amount of each payment. Comparing the stream of payments option
to the lump sum option, one can calculate the implicit interest rate of the annuity.
The implicit interest rate is the rate that equates the present value of the annuity
stream to the lump sum option. An individual prefers the lump sum payment over
the annuity payments if the lump sum value exceeds their own internal present value
of the annuity. Equivalently, an individual prefers the lump sum payment over
the annuity payments if their internal (exponential) discount rate is higher than the
implicit interest rate o¤ered in the annuity. The less patient the individual, the more
likely they will be to take the lump sum option. By observing the choices that
winners make between the two options at multiple implicit interest rates, I am able
to identify the average discount rate for lottery winners.
All three of these state lotteries advertise the dollar amount of the annuity option.
Colorado and Florida allow winners to choose whether they want the lump sum or
the annuity option after winning when claiming the prize. However, Texas requires
winners to select their payment option when purchasing the ticket. Texas provides
information to lottery players about the estimated lump sum payment for a given
drawing. Therefore, I use the actual lump sum and annuity options o¤ered to
winners for Colorado and Florida but rely on the advertised lump sum and annuity
options available to Texas lottery winners at the time of ticket purchase. Currently,
the Colorado Lotto stipulates that the lump sum option is 50 percent of the annuity
option. Prior to November of 2003, Colorados lump sum option was equal to 40
percent of the annuity option. Alternatively, Texas and Floridas lump sum option
varies as a percentage of the annuity option. Therefore, I get variation in the implicit
annuity interest rate over the lotteries, which aids identication of the discount rate.
Florida Lotto 30(20)-yr o¤ers 30(20) annual payments for the annuity option. The
payments are all large enough that Federal and State marginal tax rates for the last
dollars on the lump sum and annuity payments are the same so tax rates should not
bias the results.
Table 5 summarizes the data for the three state lotteries. As expected, the lottery
with the highest implicit annuity interest rate (Colorado Lotto 40 percent) has the
lowest percentage of winners choosing the lump sum option. The lotteries with
19Colorados lotto data was publicly available on the internet at http://www.coloradolottery.com.
Texas and Floridas lottery agencies responded to my requests for data. Unfortunately, no infor-
mation on personal characteristics of winners is available.
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Table 5: Summary of State Lotteries. Lump Sum Vs. Annuity Options.
Lottery Date
Range
N Lump Sum
/ Annuity
Implicit
Annuity
Interest
Rate
%
Choosing
Lump Sum
Colorado Lotto 40% 08/20/1994
10/25/2003
177 40% 9.98% 60.45%
Colorado Lotto 50% 11/12/2003
1/05/2008
37 50% 6.97% 86.49%
Texas Lotto 10/27/2001
12/08/2007
74 54.7% to
64%
5.89% to
4.16%
82.43%
Florida Lotto 30-yr 11/28/1998
12/22/2007
343 42.5% to
70.3%
7.45% to
2.64%
91.80%
Florida Lotto 20-yr 10/24/1998
11/14/1998
5 64.5% to
64.7%
5.2% to
5.15%
60.00%
Total 636 81.43%
Note: The implicit annual interest rate is the interest rate that equates the present
value of the sum of annuity payments to the lump sum option.
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Table 6: Frequency of Lump Sum Choices For Texas and Florida Lottery Winners by
Implicit Annuity Interest Rate.
Lottery N Lump
Sum/Annuity
Implicit
Annuity
Interest Rate
% Choosing
Lump Sum
Texas Lotto
17 54.7% to 56.99% 5.89% to 5.43% 58.82%
16 57% to 58.99% 5.4% to 5.04% 81.25%
23 59% to 60.49% 5.02% to 4.76% 91.30%
18 60.5% to 64% 4.75% to 4.16% 94.44%
Florida Lotto 30-yr
86 42.5% to 50.64% 7.45% to 5.6% 84.90%
84 50.68% to 54.64% 5.59% to 4.85% 94.00%
85 54.7% to 57.5% 4.83% to 4.38% 94.10%
88 57.49% to 70.3% 4.37% to 2.6% 94.30%
the lowest implicit annuity interest rates (Texas and Florida 30-yr) have the lowest
percentage of winners choosing the lump sum option. Within Colorado, moving from
an implicit annuity interest rate of 9.98 percent to 6.97 percent results in a jump in
the percentage of winners choosing the lump sum option from 60.45 percent to 86.49
percent.
Table 6 illustrates the frequency of the lump sum choices by Texas and Florida
lottery winners broken down by implicit annuity interest rate. For Texas, higher
implicit annuity interest rates correlate with a lower percentage of winners choosing
the lump sum option. Almost half of the Texas winners faced with implicit annuity
interest rates higher than 5.43 percent choose the annuity option whereas only about
5.5 percent of the Texas winners facing implicit annuity interest rates lower than
4.75 percent choose the annuity option. There is less variation in the percentage of
winners choosing the lump sum option in the Florida Lotto. However, it holds that
fewer winners choose the lump sum option with a higher implicit annuity interest
rate. Clearly, winners are considering the implicit annuity interest rate.
One expects decision makers to perceive more credibility in the receipt of a future
reward for an o¢ cial state lottery than for a laboratory experiment. Transaction
costs are likely to be minimal for the receipt of future lottery payments because
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Table 7: Magnitude of the State Lottery Lump Sum Options.
Lottery Mean Lump Sum
Option
Median Lump
Sum Option
Standard Devia-
tion Lump Sum
Option
N
Colorado Lotto 40% 1,996,676.76 1,600,000.00 1,401,166.07 177
Colorado Lotto 50% 1,691,205.00 1,416,067.00 1,121,074.35 37
Texas Lotto 12,366,727.35 7,993,148.73 13,263,747.56 74
Florida Lotto 30-yr 6,813,203.19 4,374,972.36 6,457,104.32 343
Florida Lotto 20-yr 4,567,324.61 4,866,004.40 408,984.15 5
All Data 5,803,285.40 3,483,569.56 7,341,957.70 636
payments are spelled out explicitly in the annuity agreement. Also, transaction
costs will be much less signicant as a percentage of the huge sums of money at
stake here compared to the small rewards in laboratory experiments. As shown in
Table 7, the average size of the lump sum option throughout the data set is almost
six million dollars. Finally, the nature of the lottery choice is di¤erent from most
laboratory choices. Instead of comparing various one time payments to an anchor
time period, a stream of annual payments is compared to a lump sum. Thus, there
is no confounding of length of delay with interval length so subadditive discounting
would not be a concern.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Results for the Minnesota River Basin Survey
In Specications I and II, I ignore the panel nature of the data. That is, I assume
that utilities are not correlated across choice occasions for a given individual.20 In
Specication I, no interactions are assumed and I have Uij =
PTj
t=0  t[qijt + (Yit  
cijt)] + ij: Results21 for Specication I are shown in Table 8. In Model I.a I
20This is not a realistic assumption so these are not my preferred specications. I include them
to serve as a baseline. Also, the random coe¢ cients specications require simulated maximum
likelihood estimation methods, so I present basic maximum likelihood estimates rst.
21I utilize the unconstrained minimization routine in Matlabs (2006) Optimization Toolbox V3.0.4
to minimize the negative of the log likelihood function as in Equations 13 and 14. The asymptotic
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assume exponential discounting. Model I.b assumes HM hyperbolic discounting,
Model I.c assumes Harvey hyperbolic discounting, and Model I.d assumes quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. All coe¢ cients are highly signicant for each estimation, with
the exception of  in Model I.d. In Model I.a, I estimate a constant discount factor
of b = :908. This is equivalent to an estimated discount rate of br = 10:2 percent:
In other words, individuals discount the future at a constant rate of 10.2 percent per
year. In Model I.b, for the HM model, b! = 0:148. Recall that as ! goes to zero the
HM discounting model becomes the exponential discounting model. Thus, b! = 0:148
suggests that the best tting HM hyperbolic model is close to an exponential model.
For the Harvey Model in Model I.c, b = 0:389. This is in line with estimates from
previous studies. In Model I.d, for quasi-hyperbolic discounting, b = :909: Recall
that the  parameter measures the extent of the departure from the exponential
discounting model. Quantitatively, b = :909 does not represent a large deviation
from the exponential assumption and is statistically not di¤erent from 1.
In specication I, the exponential discounting model has the second highest log
likelihood value. Thus, I do not nd evidence that either of the single parameter
hyperbolic models are preferred to the exponential model. Models I.a and I.d are
nested; Model I.c is a special case of Model I.d with the restriction that  = 1:
Therefore, I can perform a likelihood ratio test with the null hypothesis that  = 1:
From Table 8, the likelihood ratio test statistic is equal to 0.4393.22 Hence, I fail to
reject the null hypothesis that  = 1: There is no evidence in this rst specication
to support quasi-hyperbolic discounting over the standard exponential model.
In specication II, I model heterogeneity by assuming that  and  depend upon
observed personal characteristics;  = 0+xit and  = 0+xit, where xit is a vector
of personal characteristics for individual i at time t. Gathered personal characteristics
that could potentially inuence utility include age, income, sex, education level, and
whether the respondent resides within the Minnesota River Basin. Table 9 reports
results for this specication.23 ;24
standard errors for the maximum likelihood parameter estimates, b, are estimated with the diagonal
entries of
p
H 1, where H is the Hessian matrix of second derivatives = @
2LL(b)
@b@b0 evaluated at the
optimum. The Hessian is calculated by the BFGS method.
22The test statistic is equal to twice the di¤erence of the log likelihoods and is distributed chi-
square with one degree of freedom.
23I also examine specications treating the discounting parameters as linear functions of observable
characteristics and  and  as random coe¢ cients for all discounting models. However, all observable
personal characteristics are insignicant in these specications.
24The positive and signicant coe¢ cient on income=1000000 in the  estimation implies that
the marginal utility of income increases as income increases. This is counterintuitive so I run a
specication where  is still a function of personal characteristics but  is not. In this case, the
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Table 8: Minnesota River Basin Maximum Likelihood Results: Specication I
I.a I.b I.c I.d
Variable / Parameter
Basin Improvement/100 2.620  2.658  2.644  2.662 
(0.272) (0.27) (0.273) (0.277)
Net Income/100 0.321  0.320  0.317  0.322 
(0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0234)
Exponential () 0.908  0.912 
(0.0088) (0.0104)
HM (!) 0.148 
(0.0211)
Harvey () 0.389 
(0.0366)
Quasi-Hyperbolic () 0.909
(0.119)
Log L -1145.89 -1146.81 -1150.09 -1145.64
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
The t-tests for  and  are against 1. All others are tested against 0.
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Table 9: Minnesota River Basin Maximum Likelihood Results: Specication II
II.a II.b II.c II.d
Variable / Parameter
Exponential () 0.906  0.912 
(0.009) (0.01)
HM (!) 0.152 
(0.021)
Harvey () 0.396
(0.035)
Q-H () 0.883
(0.113)
 (M.U. Public Good) Estimation
Intercept*100 3.702  3.561  3.045  3.611 
(1.096) (1.116) (1.091) (1.118)
Age/1000 -0.218 -0.213 -0.192 -0.217
(0.157) (0.16) (0.156) (0.16)
Income/1000000 0.252  0.266  0.275  0.266 
(0.079) (0.0807) (0.0808) (0.0832)
Male/100 -0.395 -0.366 -0.258 -0.354
(0.577) (0.59) (0.585) (0.593)
Education/1000 -1.841 -1.585 -0.101 -1.623
(1.6) (1.634) (0.161) (1.639)
MRB Resident/100 -0.610 -0.685 -0.763 -0.671
(0.463) (0.472) (0.464) (0.477)
 (M.U. Net Income) Estimation
Intercept*100 0.3055  0.2941  0.2573  0.2980 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.102) (0.107)
Age/1000 -0.0044 -0.0049 0.5847 -0.1248
(0.016) (0.016) (1.488) (0.16)
Income/1000000 0.0190  0.0193  0.0189  0.0194 
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0072) (0.0076)
Male/100 -0.0319 -0.0302 0.2576 -0.0293
(0.0551) (0.0552) (0.5854) (0.0555)
Education/1000 -0.1391 -0.1210 0.1007 -0.0047
(0.159) (0.159) (0.161) (0.0161)
MRB Resident/100 -0.0511 -0.0549 -0.0581 -0.0544
(0.0451) (0.0452) (0.0437) (0.0455)
Log L -1135.72 -1136.43 -1140.19 -1135.28
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
The t-tests for  and  are against 1. All others are tested against 0.
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Results for the discounting parameters in specications II.a-d are similar to results
from specications I.a-d. Again, the exponential discounting model ts the data
slightly better than the two single-parameter hyperbolic models, although non-nested
model preference is somewhat indenite. Viewing Model II.a as a restricted version
of Model II.d I can again perform a likelihood ratio test. The test statistic is equal
to .879 so I fail to reject the null hypothesis that  = 1: There is no evidence in this
interactions model in support of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
In specication III, I assume that discounting parameters are random coe¢ cients.
Specically, I assume that discounting parameters vary over people but are constant
over choice situations for each person. In Model III.a, I assume exponential discount-
ing with a discount factor, i, that is distributed normally with mean  and variance
z2 . In Model III.b, I assume that the single parameter for HM hyperbolic discounting,
!i, is distributed lognormally, where ln (!)  N(!; z2!).25 Model III.c assumes hy-
perbolic discounting with the single parameter, i, being distributed normally with
mean  and variance z2. Model III.d assumes quasi-hyperbolic discounting with a
constant  factor and a Hi factor that is distributed normally with mean H and
variance z2H . Attempts to treat both the  factor and the H factors as random fail
to converge when I assume normal distributions. Thus, I reparameterize assuming
that the  and H factors are distributed lognormally for Model III.e.26
Table 10 gives results for the random discount factors specication. The max-
imized value of the simulated log likelihood equation is greater in the exponential
specication (Model III.a) than in either of the single parameter hyperbolic speci-
cations (Models III.b and III.c). Freeing up the additional  parameter in Model
III.d leads to only a miniscule improvement in the simulated log likelihood at con-
vergence compared to Model III.a with  restricted to one. Finally, both the mean
and standard deviation of the log of the quasi-hyperbolic  parameter in Model III.e
are statistically insignicant and model t improves only slightly. Once again, I fail
to reject the null hypothesis of exponential discounting.
As seen in Table 10, signicant heterogeneity exists in the discounting parameters
throughout all four discounting models. There are especially wide distributions in
the single parameter hyperbolic specications. When accounting for heterogeneity in
signicance on the income=1000000 variable in the  estimation disappears.
25When assuming a normal distribution for !, large draws from the normal distribution imply large
negative discount factors, which are theoretically impossible and cause problems for maximization
of the simulated log likelihood equation. Thus, I assume a lognormal distribution for !.
26This reparameterization comes at a cost; it makes the nested comparison of the exponential and
quasi-hyperbolic models less obvious.
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Table 10: Minnesota River Basin Simulated Maximum Likelihood Results: Specica-
tion III
III.a III.b III.c III.d III.e
Variable / Parameter
Basin Improvement/100 3.408  3.598  3.360  3.404  3.429 
(0.274) (0.294) (0.28) (0.282) (0.3)
Net Income/100 0.388  0.382  0.372  0.388  0.391 
(0.027) (0.0269) (0.0262) (0.0269) (0.0283)
Exponential ()
Mean 0.899  0.899 
(0.0109) (0.012)
S.D. 0.107  0.107 
(0.0128) (0.013)
ln(!) (HM)
Mean -2.248 
(0.205)
S.D. 1.860 
(0.306)
Harvey ()
Mean 0.418 
(0.045)
S.D. 0.411 
(0.054)
Quasi-Hyperbolic () 1.006
(0.116)
ln ()
Mean 0.0234
(0.133)
S.D. -0.374
(0.289)
ln()
Mean -0.111 
(0.014)
S.D. 0.114 
(0.015)
Simulated Log L -1111.22 -1127.43 -1126.38 -1111.22 1110.46
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
The t-tests for  and  are against 1. All others are tested against 0.
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Table 11: Point Estimates of Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of (!) and ()
and () Parameters from Specication III
Median Mean Std. Dev.
Parameter
HM (!) 0.106 0.595 3.301
Quasi-Hyperbolic () 1.024 1.098 0.426
Quasi-Hyperbolic () 0.8948 0.901 0.103
discount factors, the average exponential discount factor is 0.899, which corresponds
to an average annual exponential discount rate of 11.2 percent. Point estimates
of the median, mean, and standard deviation for logged discounting parameters in
specication III are shown in Table 11.
In specication IV, I assume that discount factors do not vary over people but
coe¢ cients  and  do vary over individuals. Specically, I assume for each of the
four discounting models that i and i are distributed normally across individuals
with respective means  and  and variances z2 and z
2
. Table 12 presents results for
specication IV.
Examining the maximized values of the simulated log-likelihood functions in Table
12, the exponential model IV.a ts the data better than either of the single parameter
hyperbolic models. A simulated likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis
that  = 1.27 Also, a b = 1:183 does not indicate any present bias. In Model IV.a, ab = :876 implies a constant discount rate of br = 0:141:
Finally, in specication V, I assume that all model parameters are random. Ta-
ble 13 presents results for specication V and Table 14 shows point estimates for
the logged parameters. The same pattern from the previous specications holds in
that the exponential model (V.a) achieves a higher maximized log likelihood value
than does either of the single parameter hyperbolic models. Comparing Model V.d
to Model V.a we once again fail to see signicant model improvement with the un-
27Lee (1999) shows that a simulated likelihood ratio test statistic equal to twice the di¤erence
between the maximized values of the unconstrained and constrained simulated log likelihood func-
tions is asymptotically chi-square distributed. The asymptotic chi-square distribution of the test
statistic has a non-centrality parameter k and v degrees of freedom, where v equals the number
of constraints. Lee (1999) also nds that the non-centrality parameter k is negligable when the
number of simulation draws is large enough relative to the sample size. In a Monte Carlo example,
Lee nds that 100 draws is su¢ cient for a sample size of 200 to reasonably ignore the non-centrality
parameter.
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Table 12: Minnesota River Basin Simulated Maximum Likelihood Results: Specica-
tion IV
IV.a IV.b IV.c IV.d
Variable / Parameter
Basin Improvement/100
Mean 2.888  3.104  3.077  2.760 
(0.402) (0.396) (0.395) (0.413)
S.D. 3.429  3.487  3.220  3.368 
(0.468) (0.496) (0.511) (0.461)
Net Income/100
Mean 0.395  0.397  0.391  0.391 
(0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0403) (0.0405)
S.D. 0.440  0.435  0.434  0.440 
(0.0456) (0.0453) (0.0446) (0.0456)
Exponential () 0.876  0.867 
(0.0125) (0.0155)
HM (!) 0.207 
(0.0301)
Harvey () 0.471 
(0.0449)
Quasi-Hyperbolic () 1.183
(0.1652)
Simulated Log L -1047.74 -1052.33 -1061.91 -1046.90
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
The t-tests for  and  are against 1. All others are tested against 0.
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Table 13: Minnesota River Basin Simulated Maximum Likelihood Results: Specica-
tion V
V.a V.b V.c V.d
Variable / Parameter
Basin Improvement/100
Mean 4.490  4.834  4.464  4.469 
(0.516) (0.545) (0.514) (0.556)
S.D. 4.876  5.235  4.850  4.845 
(0.687) (0.69) (0.735) (0.687)
Net Income/100
Mean 0.524  0.511  0.496  0.531 
(0.0507) (0.0496) (0.0491) (0.0548)
S.D. 0.492  0.493  0.503  0.500 
(0.0567) (0.0552) (0.0554) (0.0601)
Exponential ()
Mean 0.887 
(0.012)
S.D. 0.0966 
(0.012)
ln(!) (HM)
Mean -1.964 
(0.189)
S.D. 1.552 
(0.233)
Harvey ()
Mean 0.449 
(0.0451)
S.D. 0.371 
(0.047)
ln () (Q-H)
Mean 0.150
(0.13)
S.D. 0.307
(0.306)
ln() (Q-H)
Mean -0.129 
(0.015)
S.D. 0.107 
(0.014)
Simulated Log L -1008.50 -1024.53 -1030.44 -1008.16
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
The t-tests for  and  are against 1. All others are tested against 0.38
Table 14: Point Estimates of Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of (!) and ()
and () Parameters from Specication V
Median Mean Std. Dev.
Parameter
HM (!) 0.14 0.468 1.489
Quasi-Hyperbolic () 1.162 1.218 0.382
Quasi-Hyperbolic () 0.879 0.884 0.095
restricted quasi-hyperbolic  parameter. Furthermore, the  parameter enters the
model insignicantly. The point estimate of the median value of b = 1:162 does not
support quasi-hyperbolic discounting either. Appropriately modeling heterogeneity
in hyperbolic discount rates in specication V.d makes the quasi-hyperbolic model
an even less appealing descriptive model for discounting behavior in this study. The
point estimate of the discount rate in Model V.a is br = 0:128:
There is clearly heterogeneity in the discounting parameters for all discounting
models as evidenced by the statistically signicant estimates of discounting para-
meter standard deviations and the maximized values of the simulated log likelihood
equations in specications V.a through V.d. However, the point estimates of the
means of discounting parameters in Model V.a through Model V.d are quite similar
to those from specications IV.a through IV.d where I did not account for heterogene-
ity in time preferences. Furthermore, the point estimates of the means of discounting
parameters from the single parameter hyperbolic models in Model V.b and Model V.c
are quite similar to those from Models I. and II. (b and c) where I do not account for
correlation across utilities or the panel nature of the data. The exponential discount
factor (rate) is slightly overestimated (underestimated) in Model I.a and Model II.a
compared to the mean from the more appropriate specication V.a. The mean expo-
nential discount rate from Model V.a is about 2.6 percentage points higher than the
point estimate from Model I.a.
In summary, all specications lead us to fail to reject the null hypothesis that
 = 1: In other words, freeing up the additional  parameter in the quasi-hyperbolic
framework does not signicantly improve model t over the standard exponential
model. Finally, the maximized value of the log likelihood function is greater in the
exponential cases (a) than in the hyperbolic cases (b and c) for all specications. I
conclude that there is not any evidence to prefer hyperbolic discounting over expo-
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nential discounting for any of the specications.
4.2 Results for the Italian Money Data
With the two money data sets, I can estimate the discounting model assuming either
standard exponential or single parameter hyperbolic functional forms. It is not pos-
sible to uniquely identify quasi-hyperbolic discount factors because I never observe
choices that individuals make between two alternatives with future outcomes and
di¤erent time proles. That is, annuity and lump sum options are anchored to the
present in all choices. Recall that the quasi-hyperbolic  parameter measures the ex-
tent of present bias, which we cannot hope to measure when all choices are anchored
to the present.
I make some slight modications to the empirical model for this data set because it
includes observations on individuals who are indi¤erent between a lump sum payment
and an annuity option. Denote the utility from the lump sum option as ULS and
the utility from the annuity option as UA, where utility is dened as in equation
18. Then, let Udiff = ULS   UA. An individual prefers the lump sum option when
Udiff > k, prefers the annuity option when Udiff <  k, and is indi¤erent when
 k < Udiff < k. The probability that an individual chooses the lump sum is 1 
F (k Udiff ), the probability that an individual chooses the annuity is F ( k Udiff ),
and the probability that an individual is indi¤erent is F (k Udiff )  F ( k Udiff ),
where F (:) is the cumulative standard normal distribution. I estimate all model
parameters including k and these ordered-probit results are given in Table 15.
Assuming exponential discounting, maximum likelihood estimation gives b =
0:906. Since  = 1=(1 + r); this implies br = 0:103: That is, individuals discount with
a constant rate of 10.3 percent. For the Harvey hyperbolic model, I nd b = :293
and for the HM hyperbolic model, I estimate b! = 0:135. The maximized value of
the log-likelihood function is identical under all three specications. This data set
does not provide enough information to prefer one discounting specication over the
others.
4.3 Results for the State Lottery Data
Here, I apply equations 13, 14 and 18 to the state lottery data. Table 16 summarizes
maximum likelihood results for exponential and hyperbolic specications. Assuming
an exponential discounting form leads to an estimate of 0.885 for the constant discount
factor, which is equivalent to a constant discount rate of 12.99 percent. Returning to
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Table 15: Results for Italian Money Data
Discounting Model   (M.U. Money) k Log L
Exponential 0.906 0.0881 0.107 -465.750
(0.016) (0.0388) (0.0158)
HM Hyperbolic 0.135 0.0882 0.107 -465.750
(0.0031) (0.0390) (0.0158)
Harvey Hyperbolic 0.293  0.0882 0.107 -465.750
(0.0501) (0.0389) (0.0158)
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
t-test for exponential discount factor tests for  not equal to 1. All other t-tests are
against 0.
Table 5, we recall that over eighty percent of lottery winners in this sample chose the
lump sum option. Among the lotteries, the Colorado Lotto 40% and the Florida Lotto
20-yr had the highest percentage of winners choosing the annuity option. Focusing
on the Colorado Lotto 40%, we see that less than 40 percent of winners chose the
annuity option when o¤ered an implicit annuity interest rate of 9.98 percent. Thus,
it makes sense that the discount rate for this data is estimated higher than the 9.98
percent of the Colorado Lotto 40%. From the variation we observe in this data, the
model estimates that the average individual would switch from preferring the lump
sum option to preferring the annuity option at an implicit annuity interest rate of
approximately thirteen percent. The magnitude of the exponential discount rate is
within the range of interest rates found in capital markets; it is in line with interest
rates on personal credit cards for example. This implies that these individuals do
roughly equate the marginal rate of substitution between two years to one plus the
interest rate.
Discounting parameters in the two hyperbolic specications are not statistically
signicant. Recall that, in this lottery data, I never observe any choices that involve
trading o¤ a future reward in one time period for a future reward in another time
period. I only observe a lump sum versus an annuity that is paid out over a twenty to
thirty year time period. Marginal discount rates decline over time in the Harvey and
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Table 16: Results for State Lottery Data: n=636
Discounting Model   (M.U. Money) Log L
Exponential 0.885 0.0265  -322.896
(0.0377) (0.00846)
HM Hyperbolic 0.484 0.0205 -323.914
(0.704) (0.011)
Harvey Hyperbolic 0.966 0.172 -324.002
(0.826) (0.00735)
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
The t-test for exponential discount factor is for  not equal to 1. All other t-tests
are against 0.
HM hyperbolic models making the hyperbolic discounter present-biased. Looking at
Figure 2, we cannot hope to precisely determine the curvature of the marginal dis-
count rate graphs for the hyperbolic models when we do not observe future tradeo¤s,
hence the large standard errors on the Harvey and HM discounting parameters. Con-
versely, we can precisely estimate exponential discounting parameters from this data
because the discount rate remains constant for the duration of the annuity, hence the
small standard error on . Note that there was not a problem precisely estimating
hyperbolic discounting parameters in the Italian money application because the time-
frame was much shorter. Examining Figure 1, discount factors track rather closely
together for the rst 10 years after which time there is a divergence.
Comparing the maximized values of the log likelihood functions, the HM hyper-
bolic model ts the data only slightly better than the Harvey hyperbolic model. The
exponential specication is cautiously preferred to both of the hyperbolic specica-
tions on the basis of non-nested model selection criteria keeping in mind that I do
not have enough intertemporal variation here to precisely estimate the hyperbolic
parameters. I can imagine two types of intertemporal variation that would facilitate
the estimation of hyperbolic parameters for a relatively long time horizon such as
the 20 to 30 year durations of the annuity options in this lottery data. One option
would be if we could observe some individuals making the choice between a lump sum
option and an annuity option with a much shorter time horizon of perhaps several
years, observe some other individuals making the choice between a lump sum option
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and an annuity option with a time horizon of perhaps ten years, and some others
making the longer term annuity choices such as those which I observe in this lottery
data. Another option would be if we could observe some individuals make the choice
between lump sums of di¤erent magnitudes to be received at di¤erent points in the
future. A third option would be if we could observe individuals choosing between
immediate lump sums and annuities to be received beginning at di¤erent points in
the future. I am not aware of any revealed preference data sources that resemble the
second two options, so perhaps the best hope for estimating hyperbolic discounting
parameters from revealed preference data would be to pool several data sources of
lump sum versus annuity choices containing substantially di¤erent annuity durations.
One concern is that evidence suggests that lottery players may not be represen-
tative of the population. For example, the 2006 and 2007 Demographic Surveys of
Texas Lottery Players (2007) nd a statistically signicant di¤erences in participation
due to income and employment status. And, the 2008 Demographic Survey of Texas
Lottery Players (2008) nds a statistically signicant di¤erence in participation due
to employment status only. Thus, it likely that the individuals in the lottery data
set have a lower income on average than the general population. However, Clotfelter
et al. (1999) nd "that the di¤erences among groups are much greater with respect to
amount played than with respect to participation rate. Indeed, with few exceptions
there is remarkable uniformity in participation" (Clotfelter et al., 1999). Therefore, I
would not claim that this is the representative discount rate of the general population.
However, according to previous research, there is signicant heterogeneity in lottery
players and participation rates may not vary tremendously across demographics.
Thirty-eight percent of survey respondents in 2007 and thirty-nine percent of sur-
vey respondents in 2008 said that they participated in Texas lottery games within the
last year (University of Houston Center for Public Policy, 2007, 2008). Clotfelter et al.
(1999) nd that approximately half of the adult population in State Lottery states
plays the lottery in any given year. Thus, lottery players do make up a substantial
subgroup of the population so it is relevant to examine their average rates of time
preference. The results are still informative for public policies that pertain to lottery
players. For example, local, state, and federal tax policies apply to lottery winnings.
It would be an interesting future extension to nd a lump sum versus annuity choice
situation where individual demographic information is available to see how much the
lottery players di¤er in time preferences from the general population.
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5 Conclusion
The empirical strategy introduced in this paper provides a method of estimating dis-
counting factors that is consistent with utility-maximization theory. I structurally
model intertemporal choices to produce explicit estimates of discounting parameters
and then formally test several hypothesized discounting functions. This general esti-
mation framework can be applied to private or public goods choices.
I apply the empirical model to three data sources which represent private and pub-
lic goods, and stated-preference and revealed-preference choices. Estimation results
from all of the data sources suggest that the standard exponential discounting model
is at least as preferred as single-parameter specications of the hyperbolic discounting
model. Likelihood ratio tests of the quasi-hyperbolic model for the public goods data
fail to reject the null hypothesis of standard exponential discounting. Estimates of
the constant exponential discount rates range from approximately eight to fourteen
percent throughout the three data sets.
Because of the nature of the data sets employed in this paper, confounding factors
that are commonly part of experimental studies are minimized. Specically, the
data sets minimize perceived uncertainty in the receipt of future rewards, perceived
future transaction costs, and the correlation between the length of delay before a
future outcome and the length of the interval between two outcomes. This may be
one contributing factor for the absence of hyperbolic discounting in this study.
I nd no evidence that individuals fail to behave rationally when making intertem-
poral decisions. They are dynamically consistent in their choices and do not appear
to be present-biased. The range of discount rates estimated here falls below the
discount rates commonly found in the experimental literature but is consistent with
interest rates that we see in capital markets, as we would expect from theory. This
information is useful for conducting positive cost-benet analysis of intertemporal
policies; that is calculating the net present value of projects as individuals view them.
Moreover, these results have implications for describing behavior in a variety of con-
texts including personal savings decisions, participation in preventative health pro-
grams, the formation of human capital, and environmental sustainability. Whether
hyperbolic discounting should be used for the discounting of policies with long time
horizons is a normative question and is not addressed in this research.
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Appendices
A Alternative Error-Di¤erence Variances
Denote the alternative error-di¤erence terms as
~
ikj = ik   ij: Recalling that, for
choice set s, ij =
PTs
t=0  tijt, I have
~
ikj =
TsX
t=0
 tikt  
TsX
t=0
 tijt: (19)
Then, note that
~
ikj is heteroskedastic because the number of terms in the summations
is determined by the length of the intertemporal alternative.
~
ikj is a normal error
term with mean zero and variance given by
V (
~
ikj) = V (
TsX
t=0
 tikt  
TsX
t=0
 tijt): (20)
=  20V (ik0)+ 
2
1V (ik1)+ :::+ 
2
TsV (ikTs)+ 
2
0V (ij0)+ 
2
1V (ij1)+ :::+ 
2
TsV (ijTs)
(21)
since the instantaneous errors are independent. With the assumption that ijt i:i:d
N(0; ), this leads to
V (
~
ikj) =
TsX
t=0
 2t +
TsX
t=0
 2t: (22)
It is well known that a probit model needs to be normalized for scale so set  = 1
and I have
V (
~
ikj) =
TsX
t=0
 2t +
TsX
t=0
 2t = 2 
TsX
t=0
 2t (23)
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B Random Discount Factors Simulated Log Like-
lihood Equation
Here, I develop the simulated log likelihood equation for the random discount factors
specication. For clarity, I present the exponential discounting case. All other
discounting models are easily derived with a few substitutions. This section loosely
follows the exposition of Train (2003).
Recall the probability of a single choice for the non-stochastic discounting pa-
rameters case, Pij = F
PTs
t=0 
tvijt 
PTs
t=0 
tviktp
2PTst=0 2t

: In the case of random discounting
parameters, I focus on the sequence of choices by individual i: Denote the choice
situation as h and a sequence of alternatives as j = fj1; :::; jHg: Then, conditional on
, the probability that individual i makes a sequence of choices is the product over
all h of the single choice probabilities. I have
Pij() =
HY
h=1
F
0@PTs;ht=0 tvijth  PTs;ht=0 tvikthq
2 PTs;ht=0 2t
1A : (24)
Since the  are random, I integrate out over all values of  to get the unconditional
choice probability
Pij =
Z
Pij()f()d: (25)
I draw R values of  from f() and denote them r: The simulated choice probability
is ePij = 1R RX
r=1
Pij(r): In this application, I set R = 200: Finally, I insert these
simulated choice probabilities into the log-likelihood function to get the simulated log
likelihood (SLL)
SLL =
X
i
X
j
yij ln ePij; (26)
where yij = 1 if i chose sequence j and zero otherwise.
C Random Coe¢ cients ( and ) Simulated Log
Likelihood Equation
Recall the probability of a single choice for the non-stochastic discounting parame-
ters case, Pij = F
PTs
t=0  tvijt 
PTs
t=0  tviktp
2PTst=0  2t

: In the case of random benet and cost
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coe¢ cients, vijt = iqijt + i(Yit  cijt). Denote the vector for individual i containing
both i and i as i: i is xed for an individual across choice occasions, but varies
across individuals. Assume i is normally distributed in the population with mean H
and covariance W : i  N(H;W ): I focus on the sequence of choices by individual
i: Denote the choice situation as h and a sequence of alternatives as j = fj1; :::; jHg
Then, conditional on , the probability that individual i makes a sequence of choices
is the product over all h of the single choice probabilities. I have
Pij() =
HY
h=1
F
0@PTs;ht=0  tvijth  PTs;ht=0  tvikthq
2 PTst=0  2t
1A : (27)
Since the  are random, I integrate out over all values of  to get the unconditional
choice probability
Pij =
Z
Pij()f()d: (28)
I draw R values of  from f() and denote them r: The simulated choice proba-
bility is ePij = 1R RX
r=1
Pij(r): In this application, I set R = 200: Finally, I insert these
simulated choice probabilities into the log-likelihood function to get the simulated log
likelihood (SLL)
SLL =
X
i
X
j
yij ln ePij; (29)
where yij = 1 if i chose sequence j and zero otherwise.
D Random Coe¢ cients (Discount Factors and 
and ) Simulated Log Likelihood Equation
Here, I show the simulated log likelihood equation when discount factors as well as
benet and cost coe¢ cients are assumed to vary among individuals. Again, in the
interest of clarity, I present the exponential discounting case. Retaining the notation
and distributional assumptions from the two preceding sections of the appendix, de-
note the vector for individual i containing both i and i as  i. Conditional on , the
probability that individual i makes a sequence of choices is the product over all h of
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the single choice probabilities. I have
Pij() =
HY
s=1
F
0@PTs;ht=0 tivijth  PTs;ht=0 tivikthq
2 PTs;ht=0 2t
1A (30)
with vijt = iqijt + i(Yit   cijt).
Since the  are random, I integrate out over all values of  to get the unconditional
choice probability
Pij =
Z
Pij()f()d(): (31)
I draw R values of  from f() and denote them r: The simulated choice proba-
bility is ePij = 1R RX
r=1
Pij(r): In this application, I set R = 200: Finally, I insert these
simulated choice probabilities into the log-likelihood function to get the simulated log
likelihood (SLL)
SLL =
X
i
X
j
yij ln ePij; (32)
where yij = 1 if i chose sequence j and zero otherwise.
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